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CONSTITUTIONALISM: EAST ASIAN ANTECEDENTS
Tom GINSBURG*
INTRODUCTION
To what degree can traditional Asian political and legal institu-
tions be seen as embodying constitutionalist values? This question has
risen to the fore in recent decades as part of a new attention to consti-
tutionalism around the world, as well as the decline in orientalist per-
ceptions of Asia as a region of oppressive legal traditions.1 As
constitutionalism has spread beyond its alleged homeland in the West,
it behooves us to ask about the relationship between the particular
ideas that emerged in enlightenment Europe and North America with
the previous political-cultural understandings of non-European socie-
ties. This inquiry has implications for thinking about legal transplants,
and for our understanding of how constitutions work in the contempo-
rary world. Ultimately, it calls into question the Western narrative of
exceptionalism, in which constitutionalism and the rule of law are seen
as distinctive Western contributions.
In conducting this inquiry, it is important to be clear on terminol-
ogy. Constitution is a slippery concept: Sanford Levinson observes that
"[T]he Constitution can be said to be a model instance of what the phi-
losopher W. B. Gallie has labeled an 'essentially contested concept."'2
Most societies of any scale have constitutions in the Aristotelian sense
of politeia, defined as a set of fundamental legal and political norms
and practices that are constitutive of the polity. This view is echoed in
Dicey, who defines a constitution as "all rules which directly or indi-
rectly affect the distribution or the exercise of the sovereign power in
the state."3 Surely if this view is adopted, East Asian societies have had
* Leo Spitz Professor of International Law and Ludwig and Hilda Wolf Research Scholar, Universi-
ty of Chicago Law School, and Research Professor, American Bar Foundation. Thanks to Ji Won
Kim and Claudia Lai for research assistance and to Ernest Caldwell, Terry Nardin, and Adam
Samaha for helpful discussions.
1. Teemu Ruskola, Legal Orientalism, 101 MICH. L. REV. 179 (2002).
2. SANFORD LEVINSON, CONSTITUTIONAL FAITH 124 (1988).
3. ALBERT VENN DICEY, LECTURES INTRODUCTORY TO THE STUDY OF THE LAW OF THE CONSTITUTION
24 (1885).
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well-developed constitutions, as would any sizable entity with a func-
tioning state.4
In modern times, the word constitution has come to acquire a
more circumscribed meaning, associated with written texts that struc-
ture government and define the relationship between government and
citizenry. Written constitutions are thought to have certain defining
features (such as generality, textuality and endurance) and to perform
various functions, including providing ideals for the society and inte-
grating the nation.s In both the broad informal sense of constitutive
norms, and the narrower sense of a formal document defining institu-
tions, constitutions are pervasive and nearly universal in large-scale
polities. Having a constitution in either of these senses therefore says
little about the character of a state's legal order.
Constitutions, however, are also associated with the narrower and
empirically rarer concept of constitutionalism-the ideal of limited
government under laW.6 Associated with thinkers like Locke and oth-
ers, constitutionalist ideals were instantiated in the first modern writ-
ten constitutions found in the United States, Poland, and France at the
end of the eighteenth century. And it is this concept that some scholars
have deployed in their exploration of traditional East Asian legal struc-
tures, with some finding pre-modern analogues and others finding
nothing that could be identified as constitutionalist in nature.7
There is a large conceptual literature wrestling with the idea of
constitutionalism that we cannot even summarize here. As a historical
matter, constitutionalism is an idealist project of the modern enlight-
enment, in which notions of liberal equality are paramount. As Stephen
Holmes wrote, "[ilt involved not any possible organization of political
life but an ideal form of organization that subordinated political in-
cumbents to a higher law that they were forbidden, in principle, unilat-
4. Jaeyoon Song, The Zhou Li and Constitutionalism: A Southern Song Political Theory, 36(3)
J. CHINESE PHILOSOPHY 424, 424-25 (2009); Sungmoon Kim, Confucian Constitutionalism: Mencius
and Xunzi on Virtue, Ritual and Royal Transmission, 73 REV. POL. 371, 373 (2011).
5. BEAU BRESLIN, FROM WORDS TO WORLDS: EXPLORING CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONALITY (2009).
6. David Fellman, Constitutionalism, in 1 DICTIONARY OF THE HISTORY OF IDEAS: STUDIES OF
SELECTED PIVOTAL IDEAS 485, 491-92 (Philip P. Wiener ed., 1973).
7. Kazuyaki Takahashi, Why Do We Study Constitutional Laws of Foreign Countries, and
Why?, in DEFINING THE FIELD OF COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 35, 35 (Vicki Jackson & Mark
Tushnet eds., 2002) (Takahashi is typical in asserting that "the idea of constitutionalism is a
foreign concept to us Japanese; ... [b]efore we learned the idea from Westerners, we did not know
the idea of imposing law on rulers."). See also Kim, supra note 4, at 373 (asserting that there was
Confucian constitutionalism).
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erally to change."8 It would surely be unfair to expect to find liberal
constitutionalism, with its emphasis on equality, in a pre-modern era.
But defined in the simple way as limited government under law
that could not be changed through ordinary means, constitutionalism
is an ancient idea and one that is pervasive in the Western legal tradi-
tion.9 Indeed, any natural law constraint on government might be said
to fulfill the definition.
In this article, I want to juxtapose East Asian analogues or ante-
cedents of constitutionalism with a particular set of recent theoretical
understandings of the concept of constitutionalism. These theories are
grounded in rational choice theory, seeking to understand not only the
ideational origins and justifications of constitutionalism, but also its
functions. What functions does limited government play for rulers?
What problems does it solve? And how were these resolved in East
Asian societies that had loosely analogous institutions, even while pre-
serving certain absolutist ideas?
The article begins with the rationalist theory of why we would
want constitutionalism, focusing on the governance problems that it
addresses. It then goes into a historical review of political and legal
institutions in China, Japan and Korea that might have resolved similar
problems of governance for rulers, focusing especially on textual doc-
uments. The emphasis on China, Japan and Korea is justified because
they have been relatively under-analyzed in the modern legal litera-
ture, even as historians have made significant advances in unearthing
pre-modern institutions in those countries. Finally, the article brings
the two parts together to ask whether we can indeed speak of an East
Asian constitutionalist tradition. The answer is a qualified yes. East
Asia has long had notions of limited government and constraint on
authority and had, at certain times and places, genuine institutional
constraints on authority. I argue that these were a bit more developed
in Japan, with its tradition of divided authority, than in China and Ko-
rea with their unitary views of power.
I. CONSTITUTIONS AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
Let us begin with a review of recent constitutional theory. I
acknowledge at the outset that any rationalist theory, including ration-
8. Stephen Holmes, Constitutions and Constitutionalism, THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 189, 192 (Michel Rosenfeld & AndrAs Saj6 eds., 2012).
9. Edward Rubin, BEYOND CAMELOT: RETHINKING POLITICS AND LAW FOR THE MODERN STATE
173-83 (2007) (contrasting medieval and modern constitutionalism).
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alist theories of constitutions, are incomplete. Certainly I do not seek to
elaborate a complete theory of what constitutions are or what they do
at all times and places. But, it is also the case that recent theoretical
developments can help to clarify what is distinctive, and what is not,
about the archetypical constitutionalist state.
Rationalist theories have developed out of the social contract tra-
dition. They usually begin by imagining a pre-constitutional universe in
which each individual participates directly in decision-making about
public goods, defined as those likely to be severely under-produced by
private markets.1o Direct self-government would involve extensive
discussion and consideration of alternatives before the group made a
policy choice on any given matter. Such a world, however morally at-
tractive, faces severe problems of transaction costs and accordingly,
could operate only on a very limited scale. Constitutions facilitate the
hiring of representatives-a government-to make decisions about
public goods on behalf of the people or other principals. This creates a
problem of agency, in which the people must ensure that government
acts in accordance with its instructions. In these theories, traceable at
least to Madison, the constitution limits government where it can do
the most harm, and empowers government in areas where it can pro-
duce the most public goods.
A second kind of rationalist theory focuses on precommitment, de-
fined as an "action done... to restrain oneself from doing something
that one would otherwise do because such restraint will itself directly
improve one's future welfare."11 The basic idea is that an individual's
long-term choices may not align with their short-term choices for each
period. The conventional analogy is the story of Ulysses' request to his
crew to bind himself to the mast of his ship as it passed before the Si-
rens. Knowing that he would be tempted, Ulysses limited his own
choices, thus increasing his mid-term welfare.12
While the Ulysses analogy has come under some attack, the story
illustrates how a constitution helps resolve certain inter-temporal
10. JAMES BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT: LOGICAL FOUNDATIONS OF
CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY (1962).
11. Steven R. Ratner, Precommitment Theory and International Law: Starting a Conversation,
81 TEX. L. REv. 2055, 2057 (2003).
12. JON ELSTER, ULYSSES AND THE SIRENS (1984); STEPHEN HOLMES, PASSIONS AND CONSTRAINT: ON
THE THEORY OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY 163 (1995); Stephen Holmes, Precommitment and the Paradox
of Democracy, in CONSTITUTIONALISM AND DEMOCRACY 195, 222-23 (Jon Elster & Rune Slagstad eds.,
1988).
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choice problems for a polity.13 The founding generation binds succes-
sor generations to pre-established rules and procedures. At the most
basic level, this binding makes government possible, because it estab-
lishes institutional structures that can be relatively enduring.14 Pre-
commitment can also divert political resources from insoluble
problems (such as the best religion for a diverse society) toward solu-
ble ones (such as how much should be spent on roads].is It can make
the promises of founding leaders believable. For example, in their in-
fluential account of England's constitutional underpinning of capital-
ism, Douglass North and Barry Weingast noted how the constitutional
structure limited the ability of English Kings to expropriate re-
sources.16 This in turn induced private investment. Absent a strong
constitutional limitation on monarchical power, there would have been
less investment and less development.
Precommitment theory is also rooted in contractual thinking,
though it need not rely on a conception of rulers as agents of the peo-
ple so is distinct from the Lockean notion of the social contract. Some
constitutions, for example, have the character of peace treaties among
warring groups, or bargains among a small set of oligarchs. Such actors
will need to make binding commitments to each other; constitutions
that are inter-temporally enforceable can facilitate such commitments.
There is some debate over whether describing this binding as
"precommitment" really makes sense in that it is unclear whether one
is binding oneself or future agents in the system.17 If precommitment is
indeed not so much about committing the self so much as future actors,
then precommitment rationales really collapse into a form of agency
control. Not much turns on this distinction for our purposes. In either
case, the function of the constitution is to make a promise believable
and to extend the preferences of the founders forward into time.
Both agency cost and precommitment theories are in some sense
regime-neutral as between dictatorship and democracy. Even though
agency cost theory is conceived in modern terms as one in which the
13. For a retraction of the original analogy, see generally JON ELSTER, ULYSSES UNBOUND:
STUDIES IN RATIONALITY, PRECOMMITMENT AND CONSTRAINTS 1 (2000). See also Holmes, supra note 8,
at 192.
14. Holmes, supra note 8, at 192.
15. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 6-8 (2001).
16. Douglass C. North & Barry R. Weingast, Constitutions and Commitment: The Evolution of
Institutions Governing Public Choice in Seventeenth-Century England, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 803, 808
(1989).
17. Elster, supra note 13, at 7-8.
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collectively sovereign people hire government agents to overcome
collective action problems, one can also view the theory as having
some efficacy even where there is no literal selection of agents by the
principal. The Mencian tradition fits within this framework. No one in
the imperial Chinese tradition believed that the people should have
any direct role in the selection of government, but it was understood
that the welfare of the people was a primary purpose of government.18
Without some minimum level of economic performance, government
could become illegitimate and could be targeted with legitimate pro-
test. Such protest was not directed at changing the identity of the au-
thorities, or ensuring self-government; rather it was directed at
criticizing government behavior and providing information. It can be
seen, however, as a form of constitutional enforcement in the sense of
incentivizing restraints on government action.
Note that agency cost theories of constitutionalism should not be
confused with agency cost theories of administrative control. Norms
that limit the authority of subordinate government agents are perva-
sive in any government operation of any size, and arise from the fact
that the sovereign is always a principal itself vis-A-vis lower level staff.
All rulers need agents, and all of them utilize systems of control. Some-
times these involve law. But such systems, which are analogous to
modern administrative law, have quite a different purpose from consti-
tutionalism, which involves limiting the sovereign itself Constitutions,
then, involve agency control when the government is viewed as an
agent of a higher sovereign.
Constitutions facilitate effective recruitment of agents if the ruler
agrees to be bound by certain procedural and substantive norms so as
to motivate agents. Roger Myerson's account of the Court of the Ex-
chequer, for example, describes the central problem of the King and
Court in medieval England.19 The King needs to motivate agents to
work for him, but also needs the ability to discipline wayward agents.20
The problem arises when an agent sees another one being punished. If
she is not convinced that the punishment is appropriate, the agent will
herself begin to work less hard. It is essential, then, that the norms and
procedures of punishing agents be clear and public so as to generate
18. WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE TROUBLE WITH CONFUCIANISM 18-19 (1991); Elizabeth J. Perry,
Chinese Conceptions of "Rights": From Mencius to Mao-and Now, 6 PERSP. ON POL. 37, 39 (2008).
19. Roger B. Myerson, The Autocrat's Credibility Problem and Foundations of the Constitution-
al State, 102 AM. POL. Scl. REV. 125, 125 (2008).
20. Id.
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common knowledge about the bases of discipline. In this basic sense,
even a dictatorship needs to have a set of constitutional norms, prom-
ises about the bases and procedures of punishing agents.
I should further elaborate what I think constitutionalism on this
account is not. Michael Dowdle has criticized as ahistorical the notion
that constitutionalism necessarily involves judicial control.21 Both as
an understanding of Western development and what we are calling the
East Asian analogues, judicial enforcement of constitutional norms is
the exception rather than a sine qua non. I agree with Dowdle that the
contemporary emphasis on judicialized constitutionalism is incom-
plete as an account of how effective constitutions have developed and
actually operate. Neither judicial review nor judicialized constraint is
an essential feature of constitutionalism, though they certainly reflect
the fullest development of the phenomenon as conventionally under-
stood.22 On the other hand, some institutional constraint seems a re-
quirement. If the constraints are purely normative, then it is difficult to
see what distinguishes constitutionalism from a system of religion or
ethics.
It is also important to distinguish constitutionalism from the re-
quirement of legality (which again was a feature of Chinese imperial
governance). "Mere" legality, as expressed through the notion of nulla
poena sine lege, is best seen as device to constrain lower level agents,
and only forms a procedural limitation on the sovereign. But it does
not amount to a substantive constraint, articulated in advance, in
which a ruler is prevented from doing something that he or she would
like to do.
The question here is what are the essential features that distin-
guish constitutionalism from the broader conception of binding norms
on the one hand, and from "ordinary" law on the other. The answer I
give is simple. Constitutionalist norms are those of a legal character
that constrain the sovereign itself not merely the agents of the sovereign.
These constraints are precommitments, for they limit downstream
action in a clear way, and facilitate mutual investment by both sover-
21. Michael Dowdle, Public Accountability in Alien Terrain: Exploring for Constitutional Ac-
countability in the People's Republic of China, in PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY: DESIGNS, DILEMMAS AND
EXPERIENCES 344-45 (Michael W. Dowdle ed., 2006); Michael W. Dowdle, On the Regulatory Dy-
namics ofludicialization: The Promise and Perils of Exploring 'udicialization" in East and Southeast
Asia, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA 24-27 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds.,
2009).
22. William W. Van Alstyne, Quintessential Elements of Meaningful Constitutions in Post-
Conflict States, 49 WM. & MARY L. REV 1497, 1507-11 (2008).
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eign and subjects of the constitution. They are not limited to the norms
associated with liberal constitutionalism.
The next sections of the paper will scour the East Asian tradition
for constitution-like phenomena, particularly those involving some
kind of clear precommitment or notion of agency control by an extra-
governmental principal. We take China, Japan, and Korea in turn.23 All
the pre-modern governance arrangements in East Asia were authori-
tarian by any definition. Whether they were constitutional is another
matter.
A. China
Because China is the wellspring of East Asian thinking about law,
it is important to think about Chinese contributions to proto-
constitutionalism. Accounts of the imperial Chinese legal system have
long emphasized the combination of a theoretically unconstrained "son
of heaven" at the center of the system with an elaborate system of in-
stitutionalized structures that provided actual constraint24 At an ideal
level, the Confucian tradition had natural law elements, instantiated in
the concept of ritual propriety, or li in Chinese, and scholars have anal-
ogized these constraints to constitutionalism.2s The rules of decorum
known as li provided normative constraints on the behavior of ruler
and ruled alike.26 Others have focused on other "constitutionalist" ele-
ments of the Confucian tradition, including the rectification of names
(zheng ming) and the notion of rule by the sage.27
Confucianism was famously opposed by legalist thought, which
emphasized the value of uniform punishments, firmly administered, in
the service of a sovereign ruler.28 Legalist thinkers emphasize the lack
of constraint on the sovereign itself; law was to be used to control
23. We leave Vietnam aside for the moment. See generally TA VAN TA,, THE VIETNAMESE
TRADITION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1988).
24. Sybille van der Sprenkel, LEGAL INSTITUTIONS IN MANCHU CHINA:
A SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSIS 28-38 (1977) (describing institutions). See also Jiang Yonglin, THE
MANDATE OF HEAVEN AND THE GREAT MING CODE 11-13 (2011) (discussing scholarly debate over
Mandate of Heaven).
25. Chaihark Hahm is a major figure in this area. See generally Chaihark Hahm, Ritual and
Constitutionalism: Disputing the Ruler's Legitimacy in a Confucian Polity, 57 AM. J. COMP. L. 135
(2009). See also Tom Ginsburg, Confucian Constitutionalism? The Emergence of Constitutional
Review in Korea and Taiwan, 27 L. & SOC.INQUIRY 763, 766-68 (2002).
26. Eric W. Orts, The Rule of Law in China, 34 VAND. j. TRANSNAT'L L. 43, 52 (2001).
27. Kim, supra note 4, at 375; Bui Ngoc Son, Confucian Intellectual Origins of Constitutional-
ism, in GLOBAL CONSTITUTIONALISM (forthcoming, 2012).
28. DERK BODDE & CLARENCE MORRIS, LAW IN IMPERIAL CHINA 18 (1967).
18 [Vol 88:1
EAST ASIAN ANTECEDENTS
agents and to exercise broader social control over the population. Le-
galism, then, reflects a kind of rule by law, rather than the rule of law
ideal. Legalism, however, did not triumph, but was instead synthesized
with Confucian institutions into a new fusion.29
There were clearly several sources of ideas of naturalistic con-
straint that were ultimately embodied in positive law.3o There was the
moralistic admonition of the ruler to rule in accordance with the peo-
ple's welfare, already mentioned above in the context of the Mencian
tradition. In addition to orthodox Confucian sources, Huang-Lao ideas
were influential in the second century B.C.E., and synthesized Legalist,
Daoist, Mohist and Confucian notions of statecraft into a set of norma-
tive standards for all the major decisions of government.31 These in-
cluded lawmaking, taxation, war and criminal justice.32 The Huang-Lao
use of natural law "can be seen in part as an attempt to curtail the
powers ceded a Legalist ruler."33 Texts associated with this period
have led some scholars to argue that the Chinese linkage of law with
transcendent ethical standards was similar to the Greek ideas of natu-
ral law.34
Beyond these ideal notions, a set of institutional structures such as
elaborate bureaucratic hierarchies, meritocratic selection of state
agents, rituals and duties of remonstrance among scholar-officials
served to constrain the imperial will. No emperor, no matter how pow-
erful, could ignore these institutionalized restraints. The imperial sys-
tem was absolutist in form but limited in function.
The "constitutional" texts of the Chinese dynasty focused decided-
ly on agency control. As in Myerson's model, there was an emphasis on
constraining rogue agents by elaborating clear limits on their behav-
ior.3s Furthermore, many of these constraints were embodied in legal
texts. Consider several examples.36 The Ch'in procedural manual, dis-
covered in 1975, shows that from the very outset, the Chinese empire
29. Id.at27-29.
30. Bodde & Morris, supra note 28; WM. THEODORE DE BARY, IRENE BLOOM, & JOSEPH ADLER,
SOURCES OF CHINESE TRADITION 546 (Wm. Theodore de Bary & Irene Bloom eds., 2nd ed. 2000).
31. See generally R.P. PEERENBOOM, LAW AND MORALITY IN ANCIENT CHINA: THE SILK MANUSCRIPTS
OF HUANG-LAO 27-102 (1993).
32. Id.
33. Id. at 140.
34. See Karen Turner, Sage Kings and Laws in the Chinese and Greek Traditions, in THE
HERITAGE OF CHINA 86, 86 (Paul S. Ropp ed., 1990).
35. See Myerson, supra note 19.
36. Karen Turner, War, Punishment and the Law of Nature in Early Chinese Concepts of the
State, 53 HARV. J. OF ASIATIC STUD. 285 (1993); Song, supra note 4, at 425.
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was concerned with the problem of arbitrary decision-making by local
officials; the Ch'in procedural manual also provided for agency control,
providing detailed, written guidelines aimed to keep Ch'in functionar-
ies accountable in their administrative functions.37 The T'ang codes
elaborated a complex structure of government and lawmaking, provid-
ing detailed limitations on what could be done.38 The Q'ing codes had
elaborate rules for punishing administrative officials.39
Yet the formal ideas of legalized constitutionalism constraining
the sovereign himself were not developed in China. One sees constraint
through legality-the prior specification of rules and punishments-
and an elaborate system of legal orders directed at state agents, but
virtually no positive announcements of legal constraint on the will of
the Son of Heaven himself. The Emperor surely has duties, and is ex-
horted to behave in accordance with an elaborate set of rules, many of
which are written down and have the people's welfare in mind.
For this reason, few scholars have argued that anything approach-
ing constitutionalism can be found in the Chinese tradition.40 Indeed,
this was part of the critique of 19th century reformers such as Liang
Qichao and Sun Yat-sen, and is implicitly carried on by latter day pro-
ponents of building constitutionalism in China.41 Perhaps the critics
overstate the case; but the overall sense is of an authoritarian legality,
with limited areas of precommitment used mainly to motivate agents
by ensuring their trustworthiness and fidelity.
B.Japan
1. Shotoku Taishi
Japan's earliest "constitutional" document is the Seventeen-Article
Constitution Uashichij6 kenp6) of Sh6toku Taishi, the state-building
patron of Buddhism of the Asuka era.42 Written in 604 C.E. and adopt-
37. See Katrina C. D. McLeod & Robin D. S. Yates, Forms of Ch'in Law: An Annotated Transla-
tion of the Feng-chen shih, 41 HARV. J. OF ASIATIC STUD. 111 (1981). See also Karen Turner, Rule of
Law Ideals in Early China?, 6 J. CHINESE L. 1, 9-10 (1992).
38. See generally TANG Lu SHU YI & MING LI, THE T'ANG CODE: VOLUME I, GENERAL PRINCIPLES
(Wallace Johnson trans., 1979); Liang Zhiping, Explicating "Law": A Comparative Perspective of
Chinese and Western Legal Culture, 3 J. CHINESE L. 55, 86-87 (1989).
39. THOMAS METZGER, INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF CHING BUREAUCRACY: LEGAL NORMATIVE, AND
COMMUNICATION ASPECTS 235 (1973). See also THE GREAT QING CODE (William C. Jones trans., 1994).
40. But see VICTORIA TIN-BOR HUI, WAR AND STATE FORMATION IN ANCIENT CHINA AND EARLY
MODERN EUROPE (2005).
41. BUILDING CONSTITUTIONALISM IN CHINA (St6phanie Balme and Michael W. Dowdle eds.,
2009).
42. 1 SOURCES OF JAPANESE TRADITION 35 (Ryisaku Tsunoda, et. al. eds., 1958).
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ed as part of a broad set of Sinicizing reforms, the document reads as a
Buddhist and Confucian exhortation to maintain harmony, chastise
evil, and to obey authority.43 It certainly plays the important function,
often ascribed to modern constitutions, of helping to bind the nation
and define its ideals. But its aspirational character has led to scholarly
dispute as to whether or not the document can properly be considered
a constitution. Carl Steenstrup, in particular, contends that Shotoku
Taishi's "constitution" was not a constitution at all because it did not
restrict any extant legislature.44 He goes on to say it was not even a
statute, because the will of the Soga was all that was necessary to effect
or change any content45 On the other hand, Nakamura treats the doc-
ument as constitutional, emphasizing the government's "firm estab-
lishment of exemplary ethical behavior among its officials," and
utilizing higher law as a way to check the bureaucrats who operate the
government.46
Our key concepts are precommitment and agency control. There
do seem to be at least two articles of the Shotoku constitution that im-
plicate self-limitation of the government. Article XII involves the asser-
tion of central authority of the central government: Provincial
governors and district administrators are not to levy taxes on their
respective peoples.47 In a country there should not be two lords; the
people should not have two masters.48 "The Sovereign is the sole mas-
ter of the people of the whole country. The officials appointed to ad-
minister local affairs are all his subjects. How can they levy arbitrary
taxes on the people in the manner of the government?"49
Art. XVI reads:
Let the people be employed (in forced labor) at seasonable times.
This is an ancient and excellent rule. Let them be employed, there-
fore, in the winter months, when they are at leisure. But from Spring
to Autumn, when they are engaged in agriculture or with the mul-
berry trees, the people should not be so employed. For if they do not
attend to agriculture, what will they have to eat? If they do not at-
tend to the mulberry trees, what will they do for clothing?50
43. CARL STEENSTRUP, A HISTORY OF LAW IN JAPAN UNTIL 1868 at 17 (1991).
44. Id.
45. Id.
46. HAJIME NAKAMURA, HISTORY OF JAPANESE THOUGHT: 592-1868: JAPANESE PHILOSOPHY BEFORE
WESTERN CULTURE ENTERED JAPAN 8 (2002).
47. Id at 242.
48. Id. at 12-13.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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Both of these articles can be read as focusing on taxation authori-
ty. The former is a centralizing act, consolidating state tax authority.
Since the character of the pronouncement is a top-down command, it is
hardly constitutionalist in character, even as it "constitutes" authority.
It seems to be about the sovereign asserting power and restricting
agents of the sovereign in the mode of an authoritarian constitution.
The second provision, Article XVI, on the other hand, does include
some substantive limitation on the sovereign, along the lines of the
early Chinese restrictions on corv6e labor.si These date back at least to
the Lu Buwei in the Third Century B.C.E.52 This article also concerns
extractive authority, and presumably also limits non-sovereign gov-
ernmental entities in the provinces. These can be seen as forms of
agency control. However, it announces a limitation on the central gov-
ernment as well. Presumably, even the imperial authorities could not
violate the temporal limitations on corv6e labor.53 This self-limitation
does seem somewhat akin to modern constitutionalism-the govern-
ment announces in advance one restriction on its authority. Knowing
that their labor will not be subject to corv6e in the productive season,
people had incentives to accept the authority as non-abusive, and to
invest sufficiently in their own productive activities. This provision in
Shotoku's document is quite akin to modern theories of constitutional-
ism and its role in promoting growth through productive investment.54
Note a slight twist however. Whereas modern rationalist theo-
ries-in keeping with their liberal origins-emphasize a naturalized
market sphere of private exchange, in which state activity is presump-
tively illegitimate, the East Asian tradition has a more organic view of
the state. The nature of the self-limitation is driven by the conceptual
duty of the state to facilitate economic well-being.ss This Mencian no-
tion appears to involve a specific set of constraints on the sovereign.
51. Corvee labor involved required work, unpaid, by people of low social status to contrib-
ute to state projects. The first Chinese emperor, Qin Shih Huang Di, was widely criticized for
extreme use of corvee labor and so the Han Dynasty promulgated restrictions on its use. See
Michael Loewe, Former Han Dynasty, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF CHINA, VOLUME 1: THE CHIN AND
HAN EMPIRES, 221 B.C.- A.D. 220 at 103,150 (Denis Twitchett & John K. Fairbank eds., 1987).
52. JOHN KNOBLOCK & JEFFREY RIEGEL, THE ANNALS OF LO BUWEI 174 (2000).
53. Loewe, supra note 51.
54. North & Weingast, supra note 16.
55. Perry, supra note 18.
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2. Kamakura Bakufu
We now jump forward several centuries to the laws of the Kama-
kura period (1185-1333), the first shogunate.56 This was a period
marked by a split of authority between the emperor and shogunate
(bakufu), located in Kyoto and Kamakura respectively. There was
competition and conflict over power during the period. A central con-
cern of the bakufu government was the resolution of disputes over
land, particularly among the relatively new offices of jiti and shugo
(translated respectively as "military estate steward" and "military gov-
ernor") that were created by the shogunate.57 By specializing in dis-
pute resolution among its vassals, the bakufu enhanced its
legitimacy.58
Kamakura law was characterized by a great emphasis on proce-
dure and precedent. It was-by world historical standards-a remark-
ably well-developed system with emphasis on written proof, complex
procedures, and a record of the judicial reasoning. As the number of
disputes increased in the aftermath of the J6kyul War (1221), the ba-
kufu began to emphasize dispute resolution even more as a mechanism
of legitimation and consolidated its central position in the governance
milieu.59 It did so largely to control its own vassals and others who
were running amok in the post-war period. So dispute resolution, in
this particular feudal context, had a lot to do with both social control
and consolidating an administrative hierarchy.
As time went on, the Kamakura bakufu began to play a greater
role in actively legislating; and this provided some need for constraints
of a sort, as well as routine lawmaking procedures.6o A key document
here was the Goseibai shikimoku ("list of precedents"; the document is
sometimes known as the Joei Formulary) of 1232, a document enacted
to govern land ownership and to guide the vassals.61 Though probably
56. Intervening Japanese legal documents such as the Taiho and Yoro codes of the eighth
century were heavily influenced by the Chinese codes. The shogunate was the government of
hereditary military rulers, who controlled Japan at various points in its history.
57. Jeffrey P. Mass, The Kamakura Bakufu, in THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 46, 59 (John W.
Hall et al. eds., 3d ed. 1990) [hereinafter Mass, Kamakura Bakufli].
58. Id.
59. Jeffrey P. Mass, THE DEVELOPMENT OF KAMAKURA RULE, 1180-1250: A HISTORY WITH
DOCUMENTS 208 (1991) [hereinafter Mass, Kamakura Rule].
60. Mass, Kamakura Bakufu, supra note 57, at 78.
61. MIKAEL S. ADOLPHSON, THE GATES OF POWER: MONKS, COURTIERS AND WARRIORS IN PREMODERN
JAPAN 188-89 (2000); The Laws of the Muromachi Bakufu: Kemmu Shikimoku (1336) and Muroma-
chi Bakufu Tsuikaho 7, 16 (Kenneth A. Grossverg ed. trans., Kanamoto Nobuhisa, trans., 1981). See
translation in John Carey Hall, Japanese Feudal Law: The Institutes of judicature, being a transla-
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not meant to be a comprehensive law, the document conveys the au-
thority of the vassals and also limits them. It contains rules about
crimes, family relations, and especially property.62 The rights of non-
vassal land proprietors are to be protected in the shogun's courts, inso-
far as they did not interfere with those of the offices of jito and shug6.63
The document also restricts the shug6's authority and defines the
boundaries of their involvement.64
Jeffrey Mass views the Goseibai shikimoku as a set of rules similar
to a constitution.65 He emphasizes its general rather than regulatory
character, and he characterizes the Goseibai shikimoku as "a sketch
rather than a finished blueprint."66 It consisted of ideals and exhorta-
tions, and the underlying principle of d6ri, which conveyed the im-
portance of "reasonableness, not literalness."67 But it also contained
some detailed procedural rules. Mass argues that the code's objectives
were "to define the parameters of the gokenin's [vassal's] world and to
enunciate standards that would both exalt and restrain him."68 These
statements demonstrate Goseibai shikimoku's role in limiting govern-
ment authority and thus in engaging in agency control-a particularly
important feature in a feudal system. Moreover, Mass claims that the
code was like a constitution, in that the code was expected to be sup-
plemented by legislation in order to adapt to the constantly changing
society surrounding the vassal.69 He demonstrates the veritable flood
of legislation that followed its promulgation.70 Generality is a key fea-
ture in this analysis of whether or not the statute had a constitutional
character.
Clearly the emphasis of the Goseibai shikimoku was to control
agents, but it also limited the ability of government itself to overstep its
bounds. Mass argues that the Joei Formulary's general concerns-for
example, announcing the desire to limit Kamakura's own and its vas-
tion of "Go Seibai Shikimoku," in 34 TRANSACTIONS OF THE ASIATIC SOCIETY OF JAPAN (1906). See also
Steenstrup, supra note 44, at 84-85.
62. See Hall, supra note 61.
63. Id.
64. Adolphson, supra note 61, at 158-59.
65. JEFFREY P. MAsS, THE KAMAKURA BAKUFU: A STUDY IN DOCUMENTS (1976); JEFFREY P. MASS,
YORITOMO AND THE FOUNDING OF THE FIRST BAKUFU: THE ORIGINS OF DUAL GOVERNMENT IN JAPAN (1999)
[hereinafter Yoritomo].
66. Mass, supra note 57, at 79.
67. Id. at 78.
68. Id. at 79.
69. Id. at 79.
70. Mass, Kamakura Rule, supra note 59, at 104.
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sals' jurisdiction-were more important than the specific content.71
This highlights the constitutional character of the J6ei Formulary in
providing a higher set of rules for governance. Especially around the
turn of the fourteenth century, vassals utilized these provisions as
shields for their rights.
To be sure, there are examples of provisions that were not uni-
formly enforced. One such rule was that land tenure enjoyed for 20
years could not be adjudicated in the courts.72 This rule likely served
to secure tenure of the new vassals against older noble claimants. In
practice, the application of this rule was quite flexible, and in some
cases judgments were rendered that contradicted the letter of the
law.73 Of course, flexible interpretive moves are also the province of
modern-day courts, as any student of contemporary constitutionalism
knows. Flexible interpretation in response to evolving conditions does
not undermine the original self-limitation of the constitution; indeed, it
facilitates it by ensuring that perverse results do not occur.
In short, the Joei Formulary seems to have some constitutional
features. It is best understood as a bargain among vassals and shogun-
ate, on which third parties (non-vassal landlords) were able to effec-
tively rely. This limitation in power helped to legitimize the shogunate
and extend its rule geographically and temporally.
The Kemmu Formulary, passed in 1336 by the Ashikaga shogun
after defeating an attempt at imperial restoration, was another quasi-
constitutional document.74 The document uses the same term shi-
kimoku, indicating the prestige of the earlier document.75 It contains
17 articles, echoing the Shotoku Constitution, and generally addresses
the agents of the bakufu.76 Article 4, for example, invokes the people's
livelihood in limiting commandeering of private houses, and limiting
seizure of vacant lots, requiring their return to rightful owners.77 Arti-
cle 9 restated the need to admonish official negligence.78 Article 11
requires the shogun to set an example by returning gifts presented to
the court-surely a limitation of the highest office holder, and one that
71. Id.
72. Hall, supra note 61.
73. Mass, Kamakura Rule, supra note 59, at 106-07.
74. JOHN WHITNEY HALL, 1 THE CAMBRIDGE HISTORY OF JAPAN 474 (Kozo Yamammura ed., 1990)
75. Steenstrup, supra note 43, at 86.
76. Id.
77. Hall, supra note 61, at 22.
78. Id.
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bound subsequent rulers.79 The Shogun was also required to have
fixed times to process lawsuits (Article 17).80 This document surely
does limit the authority of the shogun, as well as his agents, especially
in dealing with the crucial land issues that were of primary interest.
Although John Haley criticizes Kamakura law enforcement for its
"remarkabl[e] lenien[cy] or weak[ness]," he acknowledges that the Joei
and Kemmu Formularies were designed "to ensure greater uniformity
and fairness by bakufu magistrates"81 He also notes that "lawmaking
had become a legitimizing exercise" by the time Joei and Kemmu For-
mularies were issued.82 However, he does not see either as constitu-
tional. Rather, he sees them as laying the basis for later developments:
in his view, "[t]he idea of the supremacy of law as command" began to
take hold at the end of the sixteenth century through the emergence of
the daimyo codes and the concept of kokka.83 He writes,
[By the end of the sixteenth century] Law had become more than
an instrumental adjunct of governance. Adherence to codified pre-
scriptions and procedures of the past and basic elements of procedural
fairness had become integral to legitimate rule... Japan hovered on
the verge of a radically new political order, one that, as in Europe,
could build the foundations of legitimate governance on the quality of
rule by law and perhaps by gradual extension the rule of laW.84
From the point of view of effective precommitment, however, the
ideas seem to develop earlier. The feudal order itself can be seen as a
set of substantive limitations on the sovereign and always, in some
sense, involves quasi-constitutional features. When these restraints are
instantiated into a legal document, such as the formularies, it makes
sense to speak of a genuine, albeit nascent, constitutionalism as early
as the Kamakura period.
C Korea
The most enduring dynasty in any East Asian country was that of
the Chos6n (1392-1910). Korean scholars have not been hesitant to
find constitutionalist analogies in the neo-Confucian institutions of the
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. JOHN OWEN HALEY, AUTHORITY WITHOUT POWER: LAW AND THE JAPANESE PARADOX 43, 44
(1991).
82. Id. at 43.
83. Id. at 49.
84. Id.
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Chos6n dynasty.as These institutions were embodied in written codes,
closely modeled on the Ming codes, which Korean scholars argue lim-
ited the authority of rulers.
A crucial early figure in Chos6n thought was Chong To-jon, whose
1394 treatise Chosun Kyonggukchon (Code of Administration of the
Chos6n Dynasty) marked a critical programmatic attempt to build a
coherent normative system.86 Chong's writings evidence great concern
with administrative reform, emphasizing the need to discipline lower
officials in all aspects of governmental work. Indeed, one of his distinc-
tive moves was to treat all aspects of governmental activity-
traditionally divided into six areas of personnel, ritual, tax, military,
criminal law, and public works-as needing legal regulation.87 Other-
wise officials might stray from the path.
Ritual was both a regulatory device and itself a tool to be regulat-
ed and promoted through law. Martina Deuchler writes that, "Chang
recognized the significance of elementary social actions... in the well-
being and stability of the state" and "stressed the importance of ritual
as a general standard by which authority and status were delineated
and differentiated."88 By providing guidelines to conducting rituals
that defined social order, Chong's work paved the way for instituting
constitutional governance later on during the period.
The key steps were taken over the next century as codes were
promulgated. Deuchler points out that works like Cho Chun's Kyongje
yukchon (The Six Codes of Administration) of 1397 and Ha Yun's Sok
yukchon (Amended Six Codes) of 1413 expressed legal concepts of the
legislators under Taejong.89 She states that these legislative writings,
along with Tae myongyul chikbae of 1395-which was a literal transla-
tion of the Ming criminal code-were considered "a kind of dynastic
85. YOUNG WHAN KIHL, TRANSFORMING KOREAN POLITICS: DEMOCRACY, REFORM, AND CULTURE 47
(2005). See Chaihark Hahm, Constitutionalism, Confucian Civic Virtue, and Ritual Propriety, in
CONFUCIANISM FOR THE MODERN WORLD (Daniel A. Bell & Hahm Chaibong eds., 2003). See generally
Chaihark Hahm, Law, Culture, and the Politics of Confucianism, 16 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 253 (2003);
Chaihark Hahm, Negotiating Confucian Civility Through Constitutional Discourse, in POLITICS OF
AFFECTIVE RELATIONS: EAST ASIA AND BEYOND 277 (Chaihark Hahm & Daniel A. Bell eds., 2004);
Hahm, supra note 25; Byung-joo Shin, Kyongguk Taejon, Choson's Constitution that Framed Gov-
ernance By the Rule ofLaw, SEGYE ILBO,Jun. 28, 2010,
http://www.segye.com/Articles/NEWS/CULTURE/Article.asp?aid=20080715002249&subctgl=
&subctg2 (Ji Won Kim trans.).
86. MARTINA DEUCHLER, THE CONFUCIAN TRANSFORMATION OF KOREA: A STUDY OF SOCIETY AND
IDEOLOGY 120-21 (1992); Kihl, supra note.85.
87. Deuchler,supra note 86, at 121.
88. Id.
89. Id.
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constitution that could be supplemented, but not changed" by Sejong's
time.90 But, although these codes involve normative limits on state
authority, they do not seem to involve precommitment per se. Ideolog-
ically, the King was unconstrained in his ability to exercise authority.
Practically, however, he was quite weak and had little role in policy,
which was dominated by the bureaucratic yangban class.
A key document in the Chos6n constitution was the Kyongguk Tae-
jon, of 1471, which served as the base of governance, and built on ear-
lier comprehensive statutes like the Kyongje Yukchon.91 Korean
scholars have nearly uniformly attributed this document with constitu-
tionalist meaning. For example, Chung claims that Kyongguk Taejon
was a symbol of state governance based on constitutionalism.92 Other
scholars purport that Kyongguk Taejon is an evidence of proto-
constitutionalism by stating that it "provided a legal framework within
which society could function, as far as that function was directly rele-
vant to the state."93 The Kyonguk Taejon provided basic rights for cer-
tain groups, established the principle of legality, restricted punishment
and torture, and provided rights for timely trialS.94
Chaihark Hahm argues that in addition to the Kyongguk Taejon
and the Myongyul (or Ming Law Code), Kukcho Oryeoi constitutes one
of the fundamental law codes of the Chos6n dynasty.s The normative
structure of the codes, which were not seen as positive legislation but
rather as embodying ancient norms, had the authority of antiquity.
The thrust of Hahm's argument is that paying attention to the cat-
egory of ritual is important in understanding the Confucian analogue to
constitutional law, meaning the norm that regulates and restrains the
activities of the ruler. Ritual, of course, involves the cultivation of dis-
cipline and self-limitation. The fact that there was no formal institu-
tionalized constraint on the emperor in the form of a judge or other
actor who could challenge his failure to act according to ritual does not
mean that there is no constraint at all. The crucial mechanism of re-
monstrance facilitated correction of the sovereign by loyal officials.
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Chung, supra note 85, at 49.
93. Deuchler, supra note 86, at 122.
94. Chaihark Hahm, Rule of Law in Korea: Rhetoric and Implementation, in ASIAN DISCOURSES
OF RULE OF LAW: THEORIES AND IMPLEMENTATION OF RULE OF LAW IN TWELVE ASIAN COUNTRIES, FRANCE,
AND THE U.S. (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004)
95. See id.
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At the same time, there was frequent use of statutory and judge-
made law: law was seen as a tool to remake society in accordance with
this ancient wisdom, and was in fact used to deal with various policy
issues. This "lower" lawmaking was a distinctive feature of the Chos6n
dynasty as compared with its predecessor Koryo dynasty.96 There
were routine procedures for the making of new law: legislative pro-
posals could be made by the throne or by officials, and were subject to
extensive deliberation.97 The King was also the formal promulgator of
new law and without his assent things could not have legal force.98 But
legislation also had to pass through ratification by the censorate and
certification by the Board of Rituals, and these bodies sometime de-
layed legislation and returned it to the discussion phase.99 We thus see
that lawmaking was institutionally constrained through a kind of ex
ante constitutional review. This does meet the test of an institutional
constraint.
William Shaw asks the crucial question: was the Korean Throne
bound by its own law?loo He answers in the affirmative, at least in a
qualified sense, and demonstrates that this served the interests of an
autonomous bureaucratic-scholar class: "In the context of rivalry be-
tween the upper bureaucracy and the throne, which characterized the
Yi period, the symbolic legitimating value of a 'royal' law could be use-
ful to the bureaucracy only to the extent that the king could be pre-
vented or at least discouraged from appropriating that value for his
own ends."ioi Deliberation provided a real set of constraints on the
throne.
It is worth noting further that these constraints of remonstrance,
deliberation and institutionalized ex ante review are arguably as ex-
tensive as any institutional constraint found in modern constitutional
democracies. Perhaps falling into the trap identified by Dowdle, many
analysts see judicial review as the sine qua non of constitutionalism.102
But empirical studies of constitutional courts, in Asia and elsewhere,
96. William Shaw, Social and Intellectual Attitudes of Traditional Korean Law 1392-1910, in
TRADITIONAL KOREAN LEGAL ATTITUDES 15, 28-29 (Institute of E. Asian Studies ed., 1980) [hereinaf-
ter Shaw (1980)]; WILLIAM SHAW, LEGAL NORMS IN A CONFUCIAN STATE 35-36 (1981) [hereinafter
Shaw (1981)].
97. Shaw (1980), supra note 96; Shaw (1981), supra note 96.
98. Shaw (1980), supra note 96; Shaw (1981), supra note 96.
99. Shaw (1980), supra note 96, at 28.
100. Shaw (1981), supra note 96, at 37.
101. Id.
102. Van Alstyne, supra note 22.
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emphasize the relative weakness of courts as constraining actors.103 A
powerful political force usually gets its way when it wants to; courts
are rightly seen as the least dangerous branch. Mostly, what courts do
in the exercise of constitutional review is facilitate a second look at
policies, and require deliberation. And this is perhaps best understood
as a form of remonstrance in which the courts are encouraging delib-
eration in policymaking.104
Does the Korean system meet our definition of constitutionalism?
Certainly the normative commitment to the rule of law was present;
and the nature of the constraints was legal: rituals and constraints on
the use of power were both legalized. The number of codes produced
by the Chos6n government's efforts to regularize and systemize gov-
ernance is quite impressive. Still, the codes mostly deal with adminis-
trative issues and not "constitutional" issues. There is little formal
expression of a substantive constraint on the King's authority, even
while the institutional constraints were elaborate and imbued with the
substance of ritual. The Chos6n codes seem to be an example of consti-
tutionalism in practice. The King, in some sense, was an agent of the
bureaucracy, used to legitimize their rule, and so the King was con-
trolled through the constitutional codes. But it was hardly in the inter-
est of such principals to emphasize substantive limits on the King's
authority. We have, then, a complex bargain between elements of an
authoritarian state, in which each was effectively limited by its consti-
tutional role.
CONCLUSION
There is a certain danger in applying categories derived from
modern Western experience to pre-modern East Asia. There is a long
history of scholars, both within and outside East Asia, using the lack of
the formal features of Western constitutions to argue that Asia needs
to engage in a particular set of modernizing reforms.los At the same
time, a careful consideration suggests that there are some materials in
the East Asian tradition that do approximate those features associated
with the modern concepts of constitutions and constitutionalism. This
103. See generally TOM GINSBURG, JUDICIAL REVIEW IN NEW DEMOCRACIES: CONSTITUTIONAL COURTS
IN ASIAN CASES (2003).
104. Ginsburg, supra note 25, at 773-74.
105. Karen Turner, Rule ofLaw Ideals in Early China?, 6 J. CHINESE L. 1, 3 (1992) ("The Western
notion of the Rule of Law has often served as a benchmark for evaluating early Chinese legal
culture.").
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is especially true if we focus less on the enlightenment norms of liberal
rights and more on the structural features of precommitment.
The examples of China, Korea and Japan demonstrate sophisticat-
ed schemes of governance. Hegel's oft-cited characterization of China
as a timeless oriental despotism bears no relationship with the East
Asian institutions that we have examined, which featured complex
constitutional arrangements. o6 Certainly all East Asian societies had
elaborate constitutions in the Aristotelian sense. But they also had
proto-constitutionalist institutions that embodied substantive pre-
commitments by the sovereign. They were able to induce agents to
work for sovereigns through a combination of normative exhortation
and institutional structure that constrained arbitrary behavior on the
part of both.
China's institutional structure featured some tension between a
formally infallible emperor, in whom undivided sovereignty resided,
and an extensive natural law tradition of normative rules accompanied
by institutional constraints that constrained the actual exercise of au-
thority. Law was not used to constrain the sovereign, but was an effec-
tive instrument of controlling lower level agents, and this facilitated
(or constituted) the operation of government.
In the case of Japan, constitutional principles were sustained
through a long tradition of divided governance and, from the Kamaku-
ra period, legalized dispute resolution that enforced a bargain between
the shogun and its vassals for the benefit of broader social actors. This
scheme involved self-limitation of the shogun and provided the basis
for effective extension of bakufu power. Though not extensive, there
were some substantive limitations on shogunal authority, and so at
least a very provisional form of constitutionalism can be identified.
Perhaps this was related to the oft-noted feature of divided authority
in Japan, in which the emperor reigned but did not rule.107 This con-
trasted with the Chinese theory of undivided sovereignty.
The Korean case is different, and much closer to the Chinese tradi-
tion. Formally, there were no substantive limits on the King's authority,
but the Chosbn institutions provided very extensive de facto limits, on
the basis of ancient norms of a natural law character. Remonstrance
and deliberation were elaborately institutionalized, and provided very
106. GEORG WILHELM HEGEL, THE PHILOSOPHY OF HISTORY 116 (J. Sibree trans., 1956).
107. Yoritomo, supra note 65.
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real limits. Ritual formed a normative and behavioral anchor.108 View-
ing the King as a kind of agent of the bureaucratic class, one can see in
this scheme evidence of the agency theory of constitutionalism, though
again the analogy is imperfect.
There is a good deal at stake in this analysis, for in Korea at least
the issues raised herein are very much alive. If the Kyongguk Taejon
was itself constitutional, then arguably the Korean Constitutional Court
case was correct to invoke it in the 2004 case invalidating the special
capital law unconstitutional.1o9 In that case, Roh Moo Hyun sought to
fulfill a campaign promise by moving the country's capital, and the
Court was called on to rule on the constitutionality of the relevant leg-
islation.11o With no constitutional language designating Seoul as the
capital of the nation, the Court relied on the notion of an unwritten
"customary" constitution that played the same function.111 Because
Seoul had been the capital since the Chos6n dynasty, the Court con-
cluded that it should remain SO.112 In contemporary South Korea, a
successful constitutional democracy, the normative power of the
Court's assertion is enhanced on an understanding of the Chos6n re-
gime as not merely a constitutional one, but a constitutionalist one.
A final note is that the analysis herein can be extended to other
East and Southeast Asian Societies. Consider the Mangraisat of the
Lanna Kingdom of Northern Thailand, one of the few pieces of evi-
dence that we have of law in Thailand before the current dynasty.113
This document provides a similar rule to that seen in the ancient Chi-
nese texts and Prince Shotoku's Constitution, limiting the King's ability
108. Sor-hoon Tan, Rights or Rites?, in CONFUCIAN DEMOCRACY: A DEWEYAN RECONSTRUCTION 183-
94 (2003).
109. Constitutional Court [Const. Ct.], 2004Hun-M554 & 556 (consol.), Oct. 21, 2004, (16-2(B)
KCCR 1) (S. Kor.) ("There is no express provision in our Constitution that states 'Seoul is the
capital.' However, that Seoul is the capital of our nation is a continuing practice concerning the life
in the national realm of our nation for a period of over six-hundred years since the Chosun Dynas-
ty period. Such practice should be deemed to be a fundamental matter in the nation that has
achieved national consensus from its uninterrupted continuance over a long period of time.
Therefore, that Seoul is the capital is a constitutional custom that has traditionally existed since
even prior to the establishment of our written Constitution, and a norm that is clear in itself and a
premise upon which the Constitution is based although not stated in an express provision in our
Constitution. As such, it is part of the unwritten constitution established in the form of a constitu-
tional custom.").
110. Id.at118.
111. Id. at 133.
112. Id.
113. David K. Wyatt, Laws and Social Order in Early Thailand:An Introduction to the "Mangrai-
sat," 15 1. SOUTHEAST ASIAN STUD. 245 (1984). See also David Feeny, The Decline of Property Rights
in Man 1800-1913, 49J. ECON. HIST. 285 (1989).
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to use corv6e labor.114 It also includes tax subsidies for investment,
providing three years of tax relief for those who have brought new
land under cultivation.1is These terms are clearly constitutionalist in
character, though are embedded with many others that focus on agen-
cy control. It is likely that other texts have similar clauses embedded in
symbolic and rhetorical material.
114. Wyatt, supra note 113, at 248 ("Ten days in the King's Service, followed by ten days
working at home, is in accord with the ancient Dharma.").
115. Id.
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